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THE LOCKERBIE TRIAL AND THE RULE OF LAW
Hans Koechler*
The Lockerbie trialweaves togethersome of the most interestingnotions in
municipal criminal law with public international law concepts of state
responsibilityand personal criminalliability. Employing it as a case study,
ProfessorKoechleranalyses the criminaljustice system from the perspective of
internationalpolitics. He outlines the major problems plaguingsuch trials by
highlightingthe encumbrances caused by overarching political concerns.
ProfessorKoechler,thus, provides a compellinganalysis of the Lockerbie trial

effectively bringingforth the controversialissues, raised thereby, which are
going to beset the criminaljustice paradigmfor a considerabletime.
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1. INTRODUCTION
At the time of this writing (November, 2008) - almost twenty years after
the mid-air explosion of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland - the mystery
of what caused the catastrophic disintegration of the American jumbo jet on that
fateful night in December, 1988 is still not resolved and the hearings of the new appeal
of the only person convicted in the case are further delayed into 20091 - amidst
revelations that the Appellant is terminally ill with cancer in an advanced stage.2
The trial of the two Libyan suspects at a special Scottish Court sitting in
the Netherlands (which lasted from May, 2000 until January, 2001) has become
an exemplary case for the evaluation of the problems and prospects of criminal
justice in the framework of international politics,' especially when the issue of
personal criminal responsibility is related to questions of terrorism, including
*

Professor of Philosophy at the University of Innsbruck, Austria President of the
International Progress Organization International Observer, appointed by the
United Nations, at the Scottish Court in the Netherlands (2000-2002)
So far, only procedural hearings have been held (altogether nine public hearings
by 28 November, 2008). As of November, 2008, the actual appeal hearings were
expected to take place in spring and summer 2009.

2

Bomber appeal to be fast-tracked. HERALD (Glasgow, U. K.), Nov. 28, 2008.

See, the author's analysis of the Lockerbie trial in regard to the evolving concept of
international criminal justice in HANS KOECHLER, GLOBAL JUSTICE OR GLOBAL REVENGE?
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 110 (Manak Publishers 2005).
149

Vol. 21 (1)

NationalLaw School ofIndia Review

2009

state terrorism. The complexity of the case lies in the juxtaposition of criminal
proceedings (at the domestic level of Scotland) and a political controversy (at the
intergovernmental level): whereas the Court dealt with the question of personal
criminal responsibility of initially two Libyan suspects,4 the criminal proceedings
were constantly being interfered with by a dispute between three states (including
the suspects' state of origin) over issues of jurisdiction as well as state
responsibility (in terms of liability for compensation for the loss of life and damages
caused by the incident).'
The author has followed the political dispute since its beginning and has through the International Progress Organization (I.PO.), an NGO in consultative
status with the United Nations - made repeated proposals for a peaceful
settlement, including the resolution of the question of personal criminal
responsibility of the accused Libyan nationals. When, approximately four years
after the incident, the Lockerbie tragedy was brought before the United Nations
Security Council as an issue of international terrorism, particularly state
terrorism, the I.P.O. had formed a committee of experts with the aim of analysing
the international legal issues and the political controversy that unfolded between
the United States, the United Kingdom and Libya over how to investigate the
incident and bring to justice those responsible. At that time, we were of the
opinion that the legal-political dispute should have been resolved on the basis of
the "Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation", the so-called Montreal Convention of 1971.6 Concerning the judicial
aspect, we had further suggested that the parties involved in the dispute "should
consider submitting the question of personal criminal responsibility to an ad hoc
international criminal tribunal".! After a session in New York City on December
One of the suspects was acquitted in the original trial (January 31, 2001). Since
that date, the criminal proceedings (i.e. appeal proceedings) relate to only one
Libyan national.
On the issue of state responsibility, see letter from the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations to the
President of the Security Council, United Nations, (Aug. 15, 2003) (Doc. S/2003/818)
and [ 3 of the Statement by Dr. Hans Koechler, international observer of the

International Progress Organization, nominated by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, at the Lockerbie trial in the Netherlands (2000-2002), on the
agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Libyan

6

7

Jamahiriya on the remaining issues relating to the fulfilment of all Security Council
resolutions resulting from the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie at Reykjavik,
Aug. 23, 2003, availableat http://i-p-o.org/koechler-lockerbie-statement-aug2003.htm.
Geneva Declarationof Legal Experts on UN Sanctions againstLibya (1992), in THE LOCKERBIE
TRIAL. DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE I.P.O. OBSERVER MISSION - STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, XXVII 109 (Hans Koechler and Jason Subler eds., International Progress
Organization 2002). See also Memorandum from the President of the International
Progress Organization addressed to the President of the Security Council of the
United Nations Doc. A746/886, S/23641 (Feb. 25, 1992).
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATlONs, XXVII, supranote 6, at 110.
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1, 1994 - in the course of which we held consultations with the President of the
Security Council - we further suggested, inter alia,that the Security Council submit
the question of personal criminal responsibility of the accused Libyan nationals
"to a criminal tribunal of Scottish Judges meeting at the seat of the International
Court of Justice".' At that time, in December, 1994, we also had called upon the
U.S. Congress and the U.K. Parliament to hold public hearings into the Lockerbie
incident and the author subsequently held a series of consultations with members
of the United States Congress in Washington, D.C.
When eventually - four years later - the Security Council had welcomed
the initiative for the trial of the two Libyan suspects before a Scottish Court
sitting in the Netherlands,9 the author reiterated the Committee's view that "a
criminal tribunal on this case should either be international in its composition or
should operate in an international framework such as that of the International
Court of Justice". 0 We also had stated that "[t]here is no reason to doubt the
report of the independent experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations on the Scottish judicial system. The real issue, however, is not
whether Scottish law is applied or not, but whether a tribunal consisting
exclusively of Scottish judges can meet the requirement of impartiality"" - because
of the political nature of the dispute which was related to a case of criminal
justice, with the United Kingdom, the country of jurisdiction (via the Scottish
judicial system), as a party.
The actual conduct of the trial and appeal proceedings in the rather unique
extraterritorial framework on the grounds of a former NATO air force base in the
Netherlands has made obvious that the concerns the author had raised in the
years when these arrangements were proposed and negotiated were well
justified.12 One fundamental aspect must not be overlooked when it comes to
these special arrangements: contrary to the widespread perception in the
international public, the High Court of Justiciary sitting at Kamp van Zeist was
essentially a domestic court, created on the basis of a decree of the Queen of the
United Kingdom" that in turn was initiated by a Chapter VII resolution of the
New York Declaration of Legal Experts on L. N. Sanctions against Libya, in STUDIES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, XXVII, supranote 6, at 112.
10

12

13

IN

S. C. Res. 1192, U. N. Doc. S/RES/1192 (Aug. 27, 1998).
Statement by Hans Koechler on behalf of the Committee of Legal Experts on U. N.
sanctions against Libya (Sept. 3, 1998) in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, XXVII,
supra note 6, at 116.
STUDIES ININTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, XXVII, supranote 6, at 110.
For a documentation of the commentaries and analyses, see STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, XXVII, supra note 6.
Letter from the Acting Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the United States of America to the
Secretary-General (Aug. 24, 1998) (Doc. S/1998/795).
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Security Council (1192 [1998]) and implemented through an intergovernmental
agreement between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.1 4
I shall not repeat here the remarks on the trial and appeal which I have
made in two comprehensive reports that were submitted to the United Nations
Organization and forwarded, in turn, to the Scottish Court." What I have learned
in the course of the two years at Kamp van Zeist (2000-2002) was that, in spite of
the "geographical isolation", even conclave-like situation, in which these
proceedings were conducted, it is almost a "mission impossible" for any judiciary
whether from Scotland or elsewhere to meet basic standards of fairness and
impartiality in the handling of a criminal case which is part of a dispute in the
domain of international power politics, and even more so when this involves
questions of state responsibility for acts of terrorism.
My conclusion - after the announcement of the trial verdict in January
2001 and again after the appeal decision in March, 200216 - was that a miscarriage
of justice may have occurred," i.e. that the Libyan national who is now serving
his sentence in a Scottish prison may not be guilty as charged. In the meantime,
more than six years after my first observation in this regard, the Scottish Criminal
Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) has come to the same conclusion (concerning
a possible miscarriage of justice). 8
With the decision of the SCCRC, in June, 2007, to refer Mr. Al-Megrahi's
case back to the appeal court, the case has entered a new and politically highly
complex and sensitive phase. The critical nature of the new judicial review process
has become more than obvious in the issuance of a so-called Public Interest
Immunity (PII) certificate by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, which
is aimed at withholding certain evidence (namely secret documents originating
from a foreign government) from the Defence and thus from public view. In a
Agreement Concerning a Scottish Trial in the Netherlands Including Annexes
and Exchange of Notes, U. K. - Neth. Sept. 18, 1998, Foreign & Commonwealth
Office, T. S. No. 43.
1" See, Report on and evaluation of the Lockerbie Trial conducted by the special Scottish
Court in the Netherlands, Santiago de Chile, February 3, 2001 in STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, XXVII, supranote 6 at 15 and Report on the appeal proceedings
14

at the Scottish Courtinthe Netherlands, Vienna, 26 March 2002, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL

XXVII, supra note 6, at 25. For a complete documentation of the author's
international observer mission at the Scottish Court in the Netherlands and the
worldwide debates about international criminal justice initiated by the two reports,
see the dedicated web site of the International Progress Organization - http://i-po.org/lockerbiesobserver mission.htm.
For a comprehensive documentation, including the author's reports, see, JOHN P.
GRANT, THE LOCKERBIE TRIAL: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Oceana Publications 2004).
UN monitor decries Lockerbie judgement, BBC News, Mar. 14, 2002.
Press Release, Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, Abdelbaset Ali
Mohmed Al Megrahi, (June 28, 2007), available at http://www.sccrc.org.uk/
ViewFile.aspx?id=293.
RELATIONS,

16

17

is

152

The Lockerbie Trial and the Rule of Law

jurisdiction where the European Human Rights Convention's rules on fair trial
are scrupulously upheld, the staying of proceedings because of non-disclosure
of evidence would be a real prospect."
This dilemma makes it all too obvious that the structural problem besetting
the proceedings from the very beginning - namely that this case of criminal
justice is situated in the space of international politics, not law - has not been
resolved in any way (in spite of the SCCRC's decision on the referral of the case).
Since the arguments advanced by the British Foreign Secretary in his PII
certificate2 0 have not been questioned by the judges - they appear resigned to
accommodate his request by the appointment of a "Special Counsel"2 1 -the
Defence will effectively be denied access to important material that has, as we
now know, been in the possession of the Prosecution since before the beginning
of the trial in the Netherlands. How can there be equality of arms, one has to ask,
if vital evidence is only made available to one party?2 2 An adversarial system of
criminal justice, in particular, would be an absurdity if a court has to operate on
the basis of a kind of "information privilege" granted to the Prosecution over the
Defence. Such a "reductioad absurdum" must not be allowed to happen whatever the
case may be, and under whatever circumstances. There should be no illusions
about it: if a fair trial cannot be ensured, no trial can be conducted -because (appeal)
proceedings on the basis of evidence that is withheld from one side do not belong
in a court of law, but would be an exercise of authoritarian (state) power - and
would thus make a mockery of the separation of powers, an indispensable
23
principle of the rule of law.
"

20

21
22

23

See Press Release, International Progress Organization, Statement by Dr Hans
Koechler, International Observer, appointed by the United Nations, at the Scottish
Court in the Netherlands (Lockerbie Trial), on the withholding of supposedly secret
evidence from the Defence by order of the Government of the United Kingdom,
(Feb. 25, 2008), available at http://i-p-o.org/Lockerbie-statement-koechler25Feb08.htm; Letter from Hans Koechler to the Foreign Secretary of the United
Kingdom, David Miliband (July 21, 2008), available at http://i-p-o.org/ipo-nr21July2008-lockerbie appeal.htm.
In a reply, dated August 27, 2008, to the author's letter to Foreign Secretary David
Miliband, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office wrote: "It is the Foreign
Secretary's assessment that the release of this material would do real and lasting
damage to the U. K.'s relations with other states and the U. K.'s national security".
The implications of this decision are explained below in more detail.
The Greshornish House Accord of September 27, 2008, co-sponsored by the author,
has put special emphasis on this question in the context of Scotland's independent
judicial system: "Whilst Scotland retains an adversarial system as opposed to an
inquisitorial system, the existence of a real equality of arms is crucial to the delivery
of justice." (The Lockerbie Case - Quid nunc, Scotia? GreshornishHouse Accord (Sept. 16,
2008), available at http://i-p-o.org/GreshornishHouseAccord-16SeptO8.htm.)
It is to be noted that the principle of the separation of powers does not have the
same weight in the British system as it has on the continent.
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As I had explained in my letter to the British Foreign Secretary (July 21,
2008),24 there is indeed a recent precedent of such a scenario. On June 13, 2008,
Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court in The Hague decided to stay
the proceedings in the case of the Prosecutorv. Thomas LubangaDyilo because of the
non-disclosure of exculpatory materials. 5 The judges ruled as follows: "The
Chamber has unhesitatingly concluded that the right to a fair trial - which is
without doubt a fundamental right - includes an entitlement to disclosure of
exculpatory material ... "26 They further referred to an earlier ruling by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, according to which
"the public interest [...] is excluded where its application would deny to the
accused the opportunity to establish his or her innocence".27
Furthermore, it should be made clear that the appointment of a "Special
Counsel" by the Court - who will be provided with a confidential summary of
the evidence in question - will not in any way solve the problem. I am rather
surprised that the High Court ruled on August 19, 2008 that such Counsel should
be appointed at all - a decision that has not been disclosed to the public when it
was issued but only was revealed through the author's action several weeks
later.28 On the basis of what criteria is such Special Counsel chosen? Who will
decide what information will actually be disclosed in the summary and what
not? Is it the intelligence services of the UK and an unnamed "foreign country" or
the Lord Advocate (Prosecutor) or the Court? In this almost Kafkaesque situation,
the accused/appellant will never be allowed to know in full what specific
additional information has been in the possession of the Prosecution all along; he,
thus, is not only denied the basic human right (enshrined in Article 6(3)(c) of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms) to defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing,2 9 but
will be deliberately kept in the dark about possible exculpatory material.
24

25

The full text of the letter is reproduced at http://i-p-o.org/ipo-nr-21July2008lockerbie-appeal.htm.
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01704-01/06 (Int'l. Crim. Ct. 2008).

26

Id.at9J77.

27

Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT-98-33-A, Judgment, April 19, 2004, Par. 180 (Int'l Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia).
Interview by Reevel Alderson of BBC News with the author, in Glasgow (Sept. 17,
2008). See also, Press Release, International Progress Organisation, Law and Politics
in the Lockerbie Case, (Sept. 22, 2008), Doc. No. 22 September 2008P/RE/20287c-is.
For details of the Scottish judges' ruling to appoint "Special Counsel" for Mr. AlMegrahi see the BBC report based on an interview with the author: Reevel Alderson,

28

29

Appeal court plans Lockerbie Move, BBC NEws, (Sept. 17, 2008), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/scotland/south-ofscotland/7622223.stm. See

also the letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to a member of the
British House of Commons (Sept. 4, 2008) (on file with author), which states, inter
154
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This means that, in the phase of the second appeal - since the referral of Mr.
Al-Megrahi's case by the SCCRC in June, 2007 - the basic predicament that has
characterized the trial will be even more acute, and a solution appears to be more
evasive than ever: serious doubts persist about the fairness and, thus,
compatibility of the Lockerbie proceedings with basic human rights standards.
Scotland's obligations under the European Human Rights Convention
would have made it imperative nonetheless that the Scottish judges order full
disclosure of all evidence that has been in the possession of the Prosecution and
thus reject the British Foreign Secretary's PII certificate, a measure which,
according to Scots law, would have been at the discretion of the judges. In general,
fairness and impartiality do not allow any other resolution of such an issue of
disclosure. What is at stake here is the integrity of the system of criminal justice.
The requirements of international politics (i.e. British national interests) must
not stand in the way of due process. Regrettably, the judges have decided in
favour of political expediency.
Up to a certain extent, political considerations may also have influenced the
work of the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission. The specific formulation of
the decision of the SCCRC, referred to above, reveals in itself the very problem of
impartiality in the operation of Scotland's supreme judicial review body. The SCCRC's
"Press Release" of June 28,2007, announcing the decision about the referral of Mr. AlMegrahi's case back to the High Court of Justiciary, does not simply give the reasonsfor
such referral, but also contains a strange kind of "preventive exoneration" of Mr. AlMegrahi's original defence team (who represented him during the Trial and First
Appeal in the Netherlands and in a manner that was less than adequate) and of
Scottish investigators (in connection, inter alia, with accusations of manipulation of
key forensic evidence in the period preceding the trial). In spite of Mr. Al-Megrahi's
repeated complaints about inadequate representation by his own Defence team,0 the

so

alia: "...the court ruled on 19 August that special counsel should be appointed to
assist the court and safeguard Mr Megrahi's interests in relation to this issue.
Once appointed, the special counsel will be provided with a confidential summary
of the submissions made by the Advocate General at the last hearing. The U. K.
government supports this ruling in the interests of ensuring the trial is fair."
In several conversations with the author in the period 2001/2002 (who, in his capacity
as U. N. appointed International Observer, had visited him at Her Majesty's
Prison Zeist in the Netherlands) and in a letter from Barlinnie Prison in Glasgow,

received on 6 December 2002 and addressed to the author, Mr. Al-Megrahi bitterly
complained about the lack of adequate representation by his Defence team. In
the letter, he expressed his bewilderment at "the failure of my lawyers in handling
some important issues and their disregard of my remarks during the trial and
their not giving the correct advice..." In the prison conversations in the Netherlands
he had confided to the author that his Defence lawyers had, repeatedly and against
his express will, signed "Minutes of Agreement" with the Prosecution.
155
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Commission bluntly stated that it "did not consider the allegations to be wellfounded"." The SCCRC apparently wanted to have these questions as to the
fairness and impartiality of Mr. Al-Megrahi's trial and (First) Appeal excluded
from a new appeal. Another remarkable feature of the SCCRC's News Release
was that it kept one of the six grounds for the referral secret. 2
A further dispute between the Crown Office (Prosecution) and Defence
over the scope of the new appeal underlines the serious concerns about fairness
and impartiality which the author has repeatedly raised since the beginning of
the Lockerbie trial:
(a)

The Prosecution wanted to restrict the "reasons" of appeal to the six
reasons enumerated in the referral decision of the SCCRC. Can an appeal
be fair - or at all meaningful - if the Defence is prevented from developing
the argument on the basis of additional reasons (not mentioned by the
SCCRC) why Mr. Al-Megrahi may have suffered a miscarriage of justice?"

(b) The more general question is what specific evidence will be admitted in
the new appeal hearings. Will the Defence be in a position to use material
that has become available in the time that has passed since the original
verdict (in January, 2001) - contrary to the expressed position of the
Prosecution? As matters stand now, the government of the United
Kingdom will effectively be in a position to interfere into the proceedings
by determining that certain material, due to its "sensitive" nature in
terms of national security, cannot be disclosed to the Appellant.
"

Press Release, Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, supra note 18, at 7. In
spite of all these well documented complaints, the SCCRC found it appropriate to

issue a "clean bill of health" for the defence team. The question which has to be
asked is why the S. C. C. R. C. considered it necessary to issue such an exoneration

when it would have been sufficient for the Commission to give the actual reasons
for the referral. On the lack of adequate defence, see also Hans Koechler, Report on
the appealproceedings at the Scottish Court in the Netherlands (Lockerbie Court) in the case
of Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed Al Megrahi v. H. M. Advocate, (Mar. 26, 2002) at 1 10-12,
available at http://i-p-o.org/koechler-lockerbie-appeal-report.htm.
32

"

See Press Release, International Progress Organisation, Statement by Dr Hans
Koechler, international observer appointed by the United Nations to the Lockerbie
Trial in the Netherlands (2000-2002), on the referral of the case of Abdelbaset Ali
Mohamed Al Megrahi by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission to the
High Court of Justiciary (June 29, 2007) (Doc. No. 29 June 2007/P/HK/20429).
In the meantime, this issue has been resolved by the appeal judges in favour of
the Defence's position: "The court's conclusion is ... that the appellant is entitled to
have his stated grounds of appeal decided by the court on their respective merits,"
(Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi againstHer Majesty's Advocate, Scope of the Appeal,

Summary, October 15, 2008.)
3

This is essentially what the British Foreign Secretary claimed in his Public Interest
Immunity (PII) certificate issued in February 2008. See, Press Release, International
Progress Organization, supra note 19.
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How the problem of the "Special Counsel" (with the issue of partial disclosure of
evidence to a person not chosen by the Appellant) is finally handled by the
Court" will further reveal how far a Scottish Court is prepared to go in
compromising the fairness of an appeal in favour of accommodating requirements
set by the executive branch. Such a case of the state authority demanding nondisclosure of evidence is indeed without precedent in Scotland. (There have only
been cases in England in connection with terror-related prosecutions.) Since the

United Kingdom has ratified the Conventionfor the ProtectionofHuman Rights and
FundamentalFreedoms (which also applies to the Scottish jurisdiction), the meaning
of the "rule of law" and the primacy of "human rights" in the European legal
space will be under special scrutiny.

II. CONCLUSIONS IN TERMS OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
At this point in time (towards the end of 2008), one can only speculate
about the final outcome of the appeal process triggered by last year's decision of
the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission; it is impossible to say, at this
stage, how the political scenario will eventually affect the legal domain;
nonetheless, some conclusions - in terms of criminal procedure - can be drawn
from the handling of the Lockerbie case by the Scottish judiciary so far.
What follows from my observations is a rather gloomy scenario for the
future of international criminal justice - in particular as regards the prospects of
the ICC (as the only permanent institution in that field) and the doctrine of
universal jurisdiction (which goes beyond the ICC's complementary jurisdiction).
The experience with the Lockerbie review process during the last few years has,
to a considerable extent, confirmed the doubts about the sustainability of the
project of international criminal justice which I had raised in my book "Global
Justice or Global Revenge?" (2003) - especially as regards the highly politicized
environment in which proceedings have to be conducted.
Fairness of a trial requires independence (a) in the conduct of the proceedings
(which have to be free from political interference, whether domestic or
3

36

At the time of this writing (November, 2008), the issue is still not resolved. At a
procedural hearing on November 28, 2008 in Edinburgh, the Court of Criminal
Appeal again deferred a decision on the details of the appointment of a securityvetted "special counsel" to a later date.
On the question of independence and integrity of the judicial process in an
international political context, see, R. K. Raghavan, Rendering CriminalJustice Globally
21(05) FRONTLINE (2004) - c.f Siddharth Varadarajan, When Power Subverts the Law, THE
HNIU, Jan. 10, 2006.
157
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international) and (b) of the mind on the part of all protagonists (first and foremost,
the judges). Neither the first nor the second requirement was met in the Lockerbie
trial and appeal in the Netherlands - neither was independence in the above
sense ensured in the functioning of the SCCRC (in the years after the first appeal
decision of 2002) nor will it be ensured in an eventual second appeal.
The lack of judicial independence has become painfully obvious in two
basic respects:

3
38

3

(1)

During the proceedings in the Netherlands, vital evidence could not be
made available because, for its provision, the Court had to depend on a
reluctant executive branch, including foreign governments. Since the
"Scottish Court in the Netherlands" (in spite of its extraterritorial setup
and a Chapter VII resolution of the Security Council having triggered the
process towards its creation) was essentially a domestic court, those
governments were - and (as regards the forthcoming second appeal in
Scotland) still are - under no legal obligation to produce certain material
required as evidence in the course of the trial. (Security Council resolution
1198 [1998] does not constitute an obligation on the part of governments
to co-operate with the Court on such matters.)

(2)

(a) The judges produced an inconsistent verdict based on flawed
arguments - something which cannot simply be explained by their lack
of analytical skills, but is most likely to be attributed to the political
scenario in which the trial was situated." (b) The Prosecution appeared
to depend, to a considerable extent, on two American FBI officers who
were present in most sessions and were seen frequently interacting with
members of the prosecution team. (c) The Defence, on its part, repeatedly
signed "Minutes of Agreement" with the Prosecution against the express
will of the first accused Mr. Al-Megrahi, the only convicted Libyan
national.39

For details, see, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, XXVII, supranote 15.
See, Article 4 of the above report:
The two state prosecutors from the U. S. Department of Justice were seated next
to the prosecution team. They were not listed in any of the official information
documents about the Court's officers produced by the Scottish Court Service, yet
they were seen talking to the prosecutors while the Court was in session, checking
notes and passing on documents. For an independent observer watching this
from the visitors' gallery, this created the impression of 'supervisors' handling
vital matters of the prosecution strategy and deciding, in certain cases, which
documents (evidence) were to be released in open court or what parts of
information contained in a certain document were to be withheld (deleted).
See, Mr. Al-Megrahi's letter, supra note 30 and Hans Koechler, supra note 31, at
Article 25.
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Altogether, the actions of the Prosecution and Defence often appeared coordinated, somehow following an external (non-judicial) strategy,40 and created
the impression of a scripted procedure (whereby the "script" was followed at
least to a certain extent) and of a negotiated outcome. For an independent observer,
from outside the Scottish judicial establishment, there was simply no other way
to explain the strange kind of "Solomonic judgment" which three Scottish law
lords had unanimously reached at the end of the trial and five other law lords
had confirmed by unanimously rejecting the (First) Appeal; in the author's
evaluation, this judgment was more the child of political (i.e. diplomatic)
convenience than of sound legal reasoning. How could one otherwise have
explained that the first suspect was found "guilty" while the second suspect was
found "not guilty"' - both on the basis of an indictment the main argument of
which was a rather complicated explanation, almost exclusively based on
inferences, how the two Libyan suspects had acted together to ingest a bomb,
hidden in a brown Samsonite suitcase (that was supposed to travel as
unaccompanied luggage to Frankfurt and from there on to Heathrow), at Luqa
airport in Malta?
In this unique case of hybrid domestic-international statutes and
arrangements, the Scottish judiciary could simply not evade the "structural
predicament" that resulted from external influences at different levels and of
different nature. Although, since the Act of Union of 1707, Scotland has had its
own judicial system within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, the Lockerbie court and the officials dealing with the judicial review
have had to operate under conditions which the government of the United
Kingdom, partly in tandem with foreign governments such as that of the United
States, has determined to such an extent that the separation of powers, a
fundamental requirement of the rule of law, was put in jeopardy:
(a)

The Lockerbie court was set up as special court by Royal Decree (High

Court ofJusticiary[Proceedingsin the Netherlands]Order 1998) the rationale of
which was derived from the binding nature, acknowledged by the United
40

41

See, Article 14 of the author's trial report of February 3, 2001 "Seen from the final
outcome, a certain coordination of the strategies of the prosecution, of the defence,
and of the judges' considerations during the later period of the trial is not totally
unlikely."
The judgment for Mr. Fhimah, the second accused, was not "not proven", as had
been erroneously stated on the web site of the British Foreign Office until this
information was corrected at the author's initiative. Cf Press Release, International
Progress Organisation, Lockerbie case: British Foreign Office corrects information
on its Libya web site and affirms the Scottish Court's right to order disclosure of
'sensitive' material (Sept. 1, 2008), available at http://i-p-o.org/IPO-nr-LockerbieFCO-OlSeptO8.htm.
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Kingdom, of a Chapter VII resolution of the Security Council, the supreme
executive - and definitely not the judicial - organ of the United Nations
Organization.'
(b)

Certain evidence had to be procured through the government of the
United Kingdom, including requests that had to be addressed to foreign
governments by way of the British Foreign Office. Because of the lack of
co-operation of certain foreign governments, substantial evidence could
never be made available in court.

(c)

More recently, the British Foreign Secretary, as explained above in more
detail, has issued a so-called "Public Interest Immunity certificate" which
orders the non-disclosure of certain material (from a foreign government)
to the Defence.

It is obvious that especially the latter measure makes a fair trial (i.e. new
appeal) impossible. As we have stated earlier, the appointment of a securityvetted "Special Counsel" to represent Mr. Al-Megrahi in regard to the "secret"
documents covered by the PII certificate will not alleviate the situation in any
way, but will make the eventual new appeal proceedings even more appear like
measures that are part of a political process, not a court of law. Such
"extraordinary" measures indeed resemble an intelligence operation that serves
the political interests of the state(s) involved in it, and are incompatible with the
independence of the judiciary and the fairness of judicial proceedings as a supreme
public interest.4

111. CONCLUSIONS IN TERMS OF LAW AND
(INTERNATIONAL) POLITICS
The Lockerbie case has exposed the fundamental, almost insurmountable,
difficulties faced by any system of criminal justice when administered in a context
of international politics:
-

2
4

The principle of the separation of powers, indispensable for the legitimacy
of judicial proceedings and for the rule of law in general, cannot be upheld
if a state's foreign policy interests are directly affected not only by the
For details, see, HANs KOECHLER, supra note 3, at 110.
See also, Press Release, International Progress Organisation, Lockerbie trial: an
intelligence operation? BBC interview of Dr. Hans Koechler - New revelation about
financial offer to a key witness from Switzerland, (Oct. 5, 2007), available at http:I/i-

p-o.org/IPO-nr-Lockerbie-50ct07.htm.
16o

The Lockerbie Trial and the Rule of Law
outcome, but by the very conduct of a particular trial (criminal
prosecution) within that state's jurisdiction, something which almost
unavoidably implies that the respective proceedings will be prone to
interference by intelligence services, whether domestic of foreign.
If criminal justice in a particular case (such as that of the Libyan
Lockerbie suspects) can only be practiced by the protagonists'
following a political script and, ultimately, the judges' committing a
kind of "judicial" sacrificium intellectus, compromising their reputation
and independence on the altar of "national interests" that are never
clearly specified (and carefully hidden from the public anyway), such
practice of the law will be intrinsically flawed and ultimately
counterproductive in terms of the fundamental goal of international
criminal justice, namely the promotion of the internationalrule of law
and, through it, peace among nations." As stated earlier, such
practice does equally not bode well for the ambitious contemporary
project of universal jurisdiction or the only permanent institution, so
far, for the administration of criminal justice at the transnational
level, the ICC.
The final chapter of the Lockerbie trial is not yet written. What can be said
at this stage, however, is that a hybrid arrangement for an extra-territorial domestic
court - such as the one for a Scottish Court sitting in the Netherlands - cannot
overcome the "judicial predicament" caused by the involvement of the respective
country's executive in an international dispute that is directly related to the
criminal case in question. So far, the conduct of the trial and appeal proceedings
by the Scottish judiciary has set a negative example; it has alerted us about the
problems and pitfalls of criminal justice in the international domain and regrettable as it may be, depending upon one's approach towards international
affairs - has done disservice to the cause of introducing "universal jurisdiction,"
whether exercised by domestic or ad hoc international courts, into the body of
contemporary international law.45
Apart from criminal justice and the (international) rule of law, the concerns
which the author has repeatedly raised as International Observer of the
proceedings at Kamp van Zeist in the Netherlands also relate to basic issues of
international security. The handling of the Lockerbie case by the Scottish judiciary
will have far-reaching implications for what some governments call the "global
See,
4

HANs KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAw (University of North Carolina Press 1944).
On the notion of universal jurisdiction, see, HANs KOECHLER, supT note 3, at 33.
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war on terror" 46 Only a just and convincing resolution (in terms of arguments
and legal procedure) of the question of personal criminal responsibility will
enable the countries involved in the dispute, first and foremost the United
Kingdom and, subsequently, the "international community", to draw the
appropriate lessons for a credible and sustainable counter-terrorist strategy.
There can be no justice without truth - and no efficient measures to protect a
country's citizens can be taken if political (in particular foreign policy) interests
prevent a proper and thorough investigation into the causes of - and possible
criminal responsibility for - an incident such as the explosion of the Pan Am jet
over Lockerbie in December, 1988.
After an involvement of over more than 15 years in the observation and
analysis of the legal and political disputes between the United Kingdom, the
United States and the Libyan Jamahiriya, essentially over an issue of criminal
jurisdiction in a suspected case of international terrorism, the author has
summarized his conclusions in remarks at the Law Awards of Scotland 2008:
Whether those in public office like it or not, the Lockerbie trial has become
a test case for the criminal justice system of Scotland. At the same time, it
has become an exemplary case on a global scale that its handling will
demonstrate whether a domestic system of criminal justice can resist
the dictates of international power politics or simply becomes dysfunctional
as soon as "supreme state interests" interfere with the imperatives of justice.
Fairness of judicial proceedings is undoubtedly a supreme and permanent
public interest. If the rule of law is to be upheld, the requirements of the
administration of justice may have to take precedence over public interests
of a secondary order, such as a state's momentary foreign policy considerations
or commercial and trade interests. The internal stability and international
legitimacy of a polity in the long term depend on whether it is able to ensure
the supremacy of the law over considerations of power and convenience.
Contrary to what skeptics and the advocates of the supremacy of realpolitik
try to make us believe, the basic maxim of the rule of law is notfiat justitia,
pereatmundus but fiat justitiane pereat mundus -'let justice prevail so that the
world does not perish.'
46

4

4

See,

THE "GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR" AND THE QUESTION OF WORLD ORDER - STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, XXX (Hans Koechler ed., International Progress
Organization 2008).
For the political implications in the triangle Libya-United States-United Kingdom,
see, KHALIL. MATAR AND ROBERT W. THABIT, LOCKERBIE AND LIBYA: ASTUDY IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (McFarland 2003). (Robert W. Thabit was the second observer of the
International Progress Organization nominated by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations for the Scottish Court sitting in the Netherlands.)
Hans Koechler, Keynote Address at Law Awards of Scotland 2008 in association
with Registers of Scotland (Sept. 18, 2008).
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